If Planning is About Anything, What is it About? by Wadley, David & Smith, Phillip
International Journal of Social Economics (1998), 25 (6/7/8) : 1005-1029.                DOI: 10.1108/03068299810212414 
  
If Planning is About Anything, What is it 
About? 
 
David Wadley and Philip Smith 
The University of Queensland, Australia 
 
Alongside Clem Tisdell’s prodigious scholarship, colleagues appreciate a quality he displays 
which characterises both economists and natural scientists. He sees the oddities in things – their 
incongruities, underside, gaps. Perusing the literature on regional and town planning, then, 
Professor Tisdell would notice articles with titles like the present one [1] and others suggesting 
uncertainty or Kuhnean paradigmatic instability in the discipline (Kuhn, 1962) [2]. 
Consequently, the purpose here is to advance the present theoretical debate with a few 
prospective ideas. In this paper we review the current disquiet, trace its backdrops and 
contemporary directions, outline an appropriate focus for town planning and then explore its 
implications. 
 
Disquiet in the discipline 
The edifice of planning has been unstable for over 20 years. By the early 1970s, faith in earlier 
comprehensive planning had waned, along with the deterministic belief that improvements to 
physical environments could engineer change to benefit either the urban disadvantaged or social 
behaviour at large. Calls for plural rather than single plans expanded to incorporate citizen 
participation and empowerment and the idea arose that the activity of planners should be politicised 
to effect social change. Some academics embraced radical critiques of capitalism circulating in 
allied disciplines such as sociology. In city hall, however, these ideas were impracticable, 
producing a gulf between practitioners and theorists. The scope of planning broadened 
considerably, as both groups pursued their respective concerns. By 1973, one commentator 
noted that: 
the conception of “planning” held both among professional planners and in British society more generally 
has widened and is likely to go on widening, and ... partly in consequence the issues that will, over the next 
three decades, be thought of as problems for ‘planning’ and “planners” will be non-spatial as well as spatial 
(Willmott,1973, p. 10). 
 
If planning is everything or, rather, anything ... 
More problematically, Wildavsky (1973) argued from the level of national or strategic planning 
that planners were overwhelmed by the scope of their discipline, absorbed by their environment. 
Efforts to plan do not equate to actual success in planning since attempts no more represent 
planning “than the desire to be wise may be called wisdom ... promise must be dignified by 
performance” (Wildavsky, 1973 p. 129). Definitions of planning characteristically separate goals from 
achievements or stress intention over accomplishment. Planning becomes a self-protecting hypothesis: 
as long as planners try to plan, it cannot be falsified. Wildavsky (1973, p. 138) thus asks what, if 
anything, has planning caused or made happen. “What, in the economist’s language, is the value added 
by planning”. That key question will be revisited later. 
 A later critic, Reade (1983) recommends “cool and careful” analysis of whether there can exist a 
specific planning approach to public decision making. Does planning produce any outcomes which 
other social methods (e.g. voting, action of elites) cannot? Reade (1983, pp. 163-68) nominates nine 
criteria associated with planning. Five are intellectually credible but problematic: four are not 
intellectually credible. As to the former group, planning implies an explicit, desired outcome: yet 
either outcomes fail to materialise (d la Wildavsky) or policies change so quickly that outcomes cannot 
be realistically monitored [3]. Planning is oriented to the future, but this is presumptuous in that we 
cannot know our tastes or those of others in times to come. Planning allegedly makes greater use of 
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technology and expertise than other decision-making methods, though in the case of elite interaction 
this claim is dubious. The monitoring of policy is another characteristic of planning but Reade (1983, p. 
166) maintains that planning systems, in fact, avoid much monitoring at all. Forecasting, as Wildavsky 
also pointed out, is epistemologically questionable and not unique to planning. 
The other four concepts are that planning takes a comprehensive view, rests on scientific method, 
is rational, and is essential to the securing of the public interest. These ideas, according to Reade (1983, 
p. 169) are not credible because they are unclear: they are merely asserted in the planning literature and 
not explained. Moreover, they are interlinked such that to question one is to challenge the whole. In 
this way, planning is better described as an ideology than a body of knowledge. 
 
Concerns of the 1990s 
In the 1990s the profession has acknowledged these concerns. Robert Beauregard (1990, p. 211) 
agrees that it has lacked a central paradigm or guiding principle since the demise of the comprehensive 
plan. John Levy (1992, p. 81) remarks that planning is discussed as a process but its direction is 
unclear: “this is an age when tactics are dominant and grand strategies and grand visions are much less 
prominent”. Since “planning” now spans kerb design to the greenhouse effect there is plenty of scope 
for specialisation - but specialists do not always interact. Consensus becomes more difficult. For their 
part, practising planners are tied to electoral cycles which overshadow the long run. Further, they have 
been criticised by radical academics, sometimes without practical experience, either for being knowing 
servants of an unjust capitalist system or not understanding the system’s precepts. 
Levy’s next points get to the nub of the malaise. Planners cut their teeth on central and inner 
city  problems. As the action drifted to the suburbs and the suburbs drifted into exurbia, recourse to 
design paradigms became increasingly difficult. Anyway, the initiative had shifted from planners to 
developers who, increasingly, laid out areas, filled in the details and presented packages to public 
planners for approval. Not everyone liked the results. Kunstler (1993, p. 15) in The Geography of 
Nowhere argues that all places (in America) suffered terribly from the way we chose to arrange things 
in our postwar world. “The process of destruction is so poorly understood that there are few words 
even to describe it. Suburbia. Sprawl. Overdevelopment. Conurbation ... Megalopolis ... This process 
of destruction, and the realm that it spawned, largely became our economy” [original italics]. 
 
Backdrops to the malaise 
Social and economic changes 
Until 1960, wartime protagonists had plenty to do in rebuilding their economies and the lives of their 
citizenry: changes to property and infrastructure almost inevitably signalled “progress” or material 
improvement to the prevailing disarray. Yet, by the end of the long boom, the West had sufficient 
wealth to allow more critical appraisal. In 1973, Rittel and Webber noted a questioning of authority in 
that “few ... modern professionals seem to be immune from the popular attack”. Historically, the 
easy problems of shelter and infrastructure had given way to more stubborn ones: people in an 
increasingly pluralistic society were demanding equity as well as efficiency (Rittel and Webber, 
1973, pp. 155-6) 
Yet, even efficiency became problematic given economic events post 1973 - oil price rises, 
unemployment, stagflation, production relocations overseas in a new international division of 
labour, fears of resource depletion and despoilation, and so on and on. Whereas the early postwar era 
had been about national integration, symbolised in the United States interstate freeway system, the 
later phase witnessed the interlocking of local economies and futures into global capitalism driven by 
transnational corporatism, an information-communications revolution and deregulation of financial 
markets. In Western countries even local planning had to consider the big strategic picture which 
bore down to complicate the smallest practical attempts at consensus. Social compacts about 
guaranteed wealth creation faltered, while radicals disputed the morality of profits. 
 
The intellectual climate 
An equally dynamic intellectual climate can be read in terms of epistemologies, ideologies and 
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operating paradigms. First, interest renewed in certain epistemologies under which planning 
operates. The 1960s and 1970s saw a flowering of humanism with its beliefs in the intrinsic worth of 
all people and their capacity for development and self-fulfilment through education. Concurrently, a 
greater role for liberalism, which only partly compromised its origins, was evidenced in the extension 
of the welfare state. The later postwar era has added more epistemologies. From its origins in 
“women’s liberation” in the 1960s, feminism is adding new agendas to contemporary planning (cf. 
Greed, 1994; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992). Multiculturalism now addresses the ethnic 
dimension of pluralism in the open societies of the West. Revisionism developed as the tendency 
in American historiography in the 1960s and 1970s to rewrite the events of the Cold War and shift 
the blame onto the United States. By the 1990s, the ownership of history and interpretation of 
events had become a major public concern: the past was no longer allowed to rest in peace. Finally, 
relativism has emerged as the view that beliefs and principles, particularly evaluative ones, 
have no universal or timeless authority but are valid only for the era in which, or the social 
group or individual by which, they are held (Bullock et al, 1988, p. 736). 
Unease also reflects development of what can be called ideologies or metaparadigms. 
Vying for influence are positivism, Marxism and libertarianism, the first eschewing value 
positions and the last two normative ideologies actively embracing them. The application of the 
three ideologies in planning is fairly standard and, since they are all well known to current 
audiences, they will not be elaborated here. 
The final backdrops lie in a set of operating paradigms -- rationalism, incrementalism and 
the postmodern. Rationalism centres around the determination of goals and means from among 
a host of alternatives. Strategies are formulated and consequences predicted. In the end, 
alternatives are selected which propose the allegedly most favourable consequences. All this is 
very proactive, logical and orderly but, as both Wildavsky (1973) and Reade (1983) remarked, 
might not bear much semblance to reality. 
Somewhat less purposive and more reactive is disjointed incrementalism or “muddling 
through” (Alden and Morgan, 1974, pp. 173-7). Direction is assumed, though little time is wasted 
chasing ideals or creating schema which will be ignored or overturned in the next policy twist. 
Some commentators relate this form of decision making to Simon’s concept of “bounded 
rationality” (1955), in which case it does not challenge or supplant rationality but, rather, takes 
a position on a rational-irrational spectrum. Incrementalism has thus appealed as a more 
accurate description of what practising planners actually do. 
The final operating paradigm is postmodernism. Prompted possibly by Marxist views that 
the value neutrality of positivism only disguised support for the status quo, academics in the 
1980s became sceptical of positivism’s claims to causal reasoning. A search began for non-
causal perspectives centred on meaning as a basis for planning practice. To Beauregard (1989, p. 
389), planners had been striving for orderliness and homogeneity through a technical 
rationality incompatible with a spatially problematic and flexible form, the articulation of 
which was increasingly confrontational and concerned with the ephemeral purposes of 
consumption. 
Postmodernists contend that knowledge is transmitted by narratives, of which there can be 
competing ones at any time. Accordingly there are no master narratives (as in a comprehensive 
plan): for its part, modernist (rational) planning is potentially authoritarian, subjugating and 
oppressive. Knowledge is not stable, nor a reliable guide to action as in positivist ideology. 
Important is “meaning” and the symbolic representations of action and behaviour. Via this 
hermeneutic approach, the only intellectual basis for master narratives or exclusive insights into 
proper values and behaviour could be faith or power (Beauregard, 1991 p. 193). 
Some have viewed regional and town planning as suspended between modernism (viz. 
positivism, rationality) and postmodernism. To the extent that the ideologies of the latter are new, they 
cut across political lines. To the extent that they are not wholly formulated, they offer something for 
everyone - humanists, liberals, feminists, libertarians and so on. Perhaps Kuhnean reasoning about 
paradigm formulation is distinctly modernist. Should it prevail, it will be necessary for the 
postmodern to consolidate its claims. As an alternative, a drift into polyphonous disorganisation or 
anarchy might satisfy some theorists but is unlikely to impress practical taxpayers. 
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Directions for planning 
A framework 
 
Enough appears above to outline the paradigmatic disjunction in contemporary planning. In so far as 
theory has been underemphasized in the last 20 years, the problem has emerged by neglect. Beauregard 
(1987, p. 367) validates theory in its capacity to improve practice. He notes that, in early planning, the 
city was unquestionably the object of attention. Later, there arose a fixation on the process involving 
the operating paradigms outlined above. It “ignored the nature of the agents who carried out planning 
and was indifferent to the object of their efforts”. Planning theory, such as it was, became both 
timeless and aspatial or, as Burchell in 1988 remarked, “the gap between short-run practice and long-
term theory is ever increasing and may ultimately threaten any ability to plan with a long view”. 
All this is not to say that, in the last 20 years, planning has been without suggestions for change or 
new directions. Emerging ideas must be categorised in terms of whether they indicate what to do 
(substantive) or how to do it (procedural) (or both). Of initial use is both a thematic classification and 
a consideration of the practical environment of the mid-1990s in which proposals are being made. 
John Friedmann (1987) arranges planning thought into four traditions which planners can use to 
determine who they are or the nature of their effort. First, social reformers see the state as the vehicle 
of social action, which planning attempts to make more effective. Analysis can be used to condition 
the performance of the economy for reformist ends. Second, policy analysts emphasise decision 
making as the means of identifying optimal courses of action. Their procedural model is thus 
rationality and the planner becomes a social engineer serving the existing power base. Third, the 
school of “social learning” sees planning as changing behaviour through experimentation in an attempt 
to minimise the contradiction between what people know and how they act. Praxis or experiential 
learning are the basis of non-hierarchical exchanges between planners and clients. Finally, planning as 
social mobilisation is a political activity seeking to change the status quo from the inequities of 
capitalism. Community awareness and action, disengagement, advocacy and co-option of decision 
making processes are some of the important approaches (cf. Burchell, 1988, p. 5). 
The practical environment for new ideas has a number of characteristics which distinguish it from 
those of former decades. The community will no longer accept “totalising discourses” or significant 
imposition of top-down authority: plenty of cases show that politicians and agencies proposing such 
means can be decimated at elections. Additionally, in what might be called the “new pragmatism”, the 
populace wants tangible, definable action now from representatives and public officials (Meck, 1993, p. 
147). The latter, however, are simultaneously losing initiative to developers who typically originate site 
plans and have the financial capacity to locate and construct whole new precincts or towns (Peiser, 
1990). “The planner [becomes] less the maker of plans than the judge of plans and the negotiator of 
planning compromise” (Levy, 1992, p. 82). Rather than grand visions, this role emphasises flexibility 
and adaptiveness because, under the imperatives of economic development, the planner knows that 
stalling will lead to proposals migrating elsewhere. The community, for all its apparent 
obstreperousness, will not reward constant negation as a modus operandi: even if it does not want 
greenfields growth, it is likely to expect renovation of built environments within the general postwar 
ethos of  “progress”. 
 
Recent contributions 
Recent planning thought can be appraised against these backdrops. Four contributions are notable. 
First, Friedmann (1993) argues that a non-Euclidian mode would see planning as professional practice 
which specifically seeks to connect forms of knowledge with forms of action in the public domain. It would 
operate in the real time of everyday events rather than in the deeper future. It would also emphasise the 
local and regional scales so as to corroborate variety and difference, engender meaningful citizen 
participation and represent the spaces of people’s everyday lives. Non-Euclidian planning would be 
normative, innovative, political, transactive and based on social learning. A couple of these elements 
require explanation. In the normative sense, Friedmann (1993, p. 483) argues from a humanist 
perspective that planning should reflect inclusive democracy, give voice to and integrate the 
disempowered, prefer quality over quantity, respect sustainability and the natural world and raise 
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gender issues. As regards social learning (the likely locus of non-Euclidian planning within 
Friedmann’s (1987) classification), the aim would be to adopt open processes which admit mistakes, 
rely on sound leadership and eschew partisan advantage. 
Sagar (1992) answers the question “why plan?” via a combined rationale, fusing the traditional 
approach of correcting market failure with the capacity to create personal growth and aid in undistorted 
communication in communities. A rationale, he argues, is necessary in meeting popular criticism of 
planners, ineducating planning novices and in providing an ideological compass. His interest in growth 
and communication follows Friedmann (1993) toward humanistic planning. Personal growth proceeds 
with social integration to increase the problem areas which can be mastered. Growth, as in clinical 
psychology, is denoted by gains in mutual understanding, acceptance and trust to the benefit of 
communications. Though personal growth must remain a side-effect of the planning process, it is 
critically important to social development. Paradoxically, to stress it would not only undermine the 
credibility of planning (too ethereal an aim) but also preclude the state one is trying to bring about. 
Sandercock and Forsyth (1992) reorient planning to a gender agenda. Theory remains male dominated 
and all but unaware of the importance of gender in practical planning. Reform will emerge through 
attention to language which is the basis of the sense of reality, order and place in the community. In 
order to use language more effectively and so make a contribution and have it effected, women require 
better access to education. Positivist ideologies are similarly exclusionary to knowledge deemed to be 
other than “objective”. By contrast, a feminist epistemology would draw on knowledge gained from 
talking, listening and intuition. Moreover, knowledge, as a social construction, is political: different 
kinds must be shared through communication to create meaning. In this regard, women will remain 
disadvantaged until fully assimilated into the public domain since urban planning has used the divide 
between public and private to men’s advantage. The gender agenda, therefore, has three thrusts: case 
studies of planning practice and a rewriting of planning history with gender as a category of analysis; 
an examination of gender in the internal culture of planners; and a gender-conscious reform of 
planning education. 
The final contribution carries the ambitious title “If planning includes too much, maybe it should 
include more”. William Lucy (1994) urges that healthy places nurture healthy people and public 
policies should sustain both healthy people and places, not one or the other. To these ends, planning 
theory should overlap more than at present into public administration and policy analysis. At the same 
time, “physical design shapes the spirit as well as the details of specific places in society” and should 
be addressed along with environmental sustainability. The connection between people and place is, of 
course, a traditional one in planning but now bears directly on Kunstler’s (1993) laments about the 
“geography of nowhere”. Lucy advocates study of how political power is structured territorially so as to 
elucidate whether ameliorative public policy is better directed toward people or places. The issues of 
population mix, patterns and density need renewed attention, as will the postmodern condition of 
spaces devoid of social meaning. Progress will require architects and landscape designers to have 
much better social and strategic understanding. Rather than relying on individual aesthetics which 
reflect introverted values, greater community well being could be achieved from an emphasis on design 
content incorporating elements such as climatology, hydrology and technology (for physical 
sustainability) and social function, behavioural interaction and economic viability (for social 
sustainability). In this way, healthier connections among people and places could be re-established. 
 
A different focus 
The above accounts reflect concerns of theoreticians with both substantive and procedural issues, more 
or less applied. Their diversity shows the uncertainty in planning thought. A common thread, 
however, is that planning or planning approval resides in the public sector. Thus it is fair, with 
Wildavsky (1973), to ask what planning actually contributes in value added to society. Since the 
question has not been convincingly answered by advocacy from outside the discipline, planning must 
speak for itself. 
 
Planning and wealth 
One therefore returns to the present title: what is planning about? Notwithstanding claims about 
amenity, social justice, equity, the environment and so forth, our contention is that the rationale of 
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planning is, and always has been, about wealth [4]. This is its core business. While this point was 
forcefully made by academic Marxists, it was cast normatively rather than positively in that practising 
planners were seen as supportive of an exploitative system. Fair or beautiful capitalism might not be, 
but pervasive it is and, for the time being, we have it. So much is said without the normative zeal of 
either Marxists or libertarians: our alliance is with realists in economics who continue to see the 
parameters and proclivities of capitalism as the object of enquiry. In Friedmann’s (1987) terms, this 
view adheres to the policy analytic school of planning. 
Planning can thus be defined as a microeconomic process of facility and landuse determination 
in the conversion of environments. It characteristically entails market interventions which arrange and 
rearrange investments - tangible and intangible, public and private, capital and operating. Wealth 
underpins all these activities. Planning can deal with wealth in three ways - via its creation, 
maintenance and destruction. It is axiomatic that if, in net terms, planning actually lowered the wealth 
in an economy over a longer term, it would have soon been dismantled or rejected by either the 
powerful and/or the wealthy. Stated differently, countries and regions are now locked in global 
competition. They do not need either public or private measures which would reduce their long term 
income or net worth. Nor might they wish to forego, for reasons of its distributional effect, a measure 
which could increase the overall wealth of the society. To echo an old axiom, without the generation of 
wealth, opportunities for welfare, a traditional interest of planning will be limited. 
In as much as planning is bracketed alongside wealth, the question of its efficiency as a 
technique emerges. Indeed, planning alone appears neither necessary nor sufficient to general wealth 
creation. Despite its recent “conversion” to town planning, Houston in Texas represents a city which 
apparently managed to grow without significant intervention (Feagin, 1990). Though the metropolis 
might have prospered more, or in different ways, had further planning been effected, one thing is clear: 
it did not shrink back to a village simply because it had only a very modest formal planning department. 
In the UK, regional development has had so-called “policy on” and “policy off” periods, thereby 
permitting analysis of the efficacy of intervention (Armstrong and Taylor, 1985). By contrast, town 
planning, once institutionalised, is unlikely ever to be removed since too many interests are at stake - 
particularly those of the bureaucracy and community pressure groups. Thus, although the idea might be 
quite rational, the prospect seems remote of Houston seeking the best of both worlds by moving into and 
out of planning for varying future periods. As Wildavsky (1973) remarked, evaluation in planning 
(scientific or otherwise) always seems precluded. 
Other macro and microeconomic activities, both private and public, create wealth and so it can be 
difficult to filter the contribution of town planning. Events in socioeconomic space occur 
simultaneously and reality is no laboratory in which individual effects can easily be isolated. This is 
the first of two reasons for which observers might have difficulty in determining the efficiency of a 
planning system. The other is that, if planning in the past had any unitary aims, they were unlikely to 
focus on wealth, which has effectively been disparaged within the discipline. 
While planning might not actually diminish wealth, it might neither create nor maintain it as 
readily as other interventions. In general, one could argue that the opportunity arises for planning to 
create wealth during facility placement or landuse change; otherwise, it could maintain wealth by 
preserving existing landuse regulations or zoning patterns. Equally, planning can destroy wealth. When 
conditions are changed, parties can be deleteriously affected. When conditions remain the same, new 
ideas for wealth creation can be blocked. Thus, whether planning is actually proposing anything or 
not, its mere existence will be influencing the generation of wealth in a community and its subsequent 
distribution. 
Clearly, to run a planning department, even if it does nothing but administer the status quo, is not 
cost-free. Yet such “operating” costs can be assumed trivial alongside the direct or indirect financial 
outcomes or the opportunity costs of planning. Wildavsky (1973, pp. 149-50) argues that planning: 
 
• might be a substitute for action; 
• uses important human resources, both direct and indirect; 
• tends to lead to spending by way of professional self-justification; 
• seeks the large and loud over the small and quiet; 
• might prefer the big model of dubious veracity; 
• can create imaginary future situations or problems; 
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• may introduce uneconomical, individual biases (e.g. excessive standards); 
•    can become an escape from insurmountable problems of the day.  
 
Outcome effects will still characterise a planning system in neutral gear, one seemingly doing 
nothing. They can be greater from a planning system which undergoes or promotes regular change. 
It will inevitably throw up winners and losers in its own version of Schumpeter’s process of 
“creative destruction” (1943). Schumpeter, of course, used this term to refer to the effects of 
technological change. Its application is appropriate in that planning, as a means to an end, is a 
technology - a way of doing things (Macdonald, 1983, p. 331). Planning is thus a vehicle of the 
capitalist system for destroying superannuated assets, presumably for the greater community good. 
At this point, identities can be introduced which illustrate the relationship of planning and 
wealth. First, it could be rational to plan when the costs (negative benefits) of not planning are both 
obvious and large. These costs are imputed since they remain hypothetical until the non-planned 
project is actually completed: Thus: 
 
Plan if: Icnp > (Icp + Acp)   
 (1) 
where: 
 
Icnp = imputed costs of not planning; 
Icp = imputed costs of planning; 
Acp = accounting or real financial costs of planning. 
 
Such a condition obviously applies in simple, single-project, structural planning involving 
infrastructure investment: building a dock, pipeline or transport route without planning would 
clearly be irrational and expensive. 
Second, a positive effect of planning is indicated when it confers greater benefits than costs so 
as to increase existing social wealth (utility). Re-using elements in the above identity: 
 
If (Ibs + Tbs) > (Icp + Acp) then Ua > Ub   
 (2) 
where: 
 
Ibs = intangible benefits to society (e.g. “amenity”); 
Tbs       = tangible benefits to society; 
U = utility (social wealth) in periods a after and b before planning. 
 
 
From this juncture arise a number of theoretical endeavours which could help resolve the current 
malaise of the discipline. One would be to enumerate and quantify the intangible or imputed 
benefits and costs and to determine their weight in specific applications. Sagar (1992), above, 
places great importance on an intangible benefit of planning, namely “personal growth”. Planners 
might consider the measurement of intangibles too difficult or rubbery, a bit positivist or not very 
postmodern. However, this issue has been routinely addressed in recent years in disciplines such as 
Clem Tisdell’s environmental economics (e.g. Smith, 1996; Sugden and Williams, 1978, pp. 148-
67). It is thus strange to see planning, in which much store is placed on intangible benefits, not 
making greater effort to quantify and promote them. 
Another consideration is the time value of money. Discounted cash flow analysis is a usual 
basis of benefit-cost determination but calculations normally assume a unitary social discount rate in 
relating the short to the long term. Planning - what Little work appears to have been undertaken in 
planning with the concept or is it about? application of variable discount rates which might more 
accurately reflect: 
 
(1) estimations of future conditions (e.g. inflation, interest rates etc.); 
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(2) community preferences vis  à  vis the short and long term; 
(3) the reality of electoral cycles; and  
(4)     variations in the measurement of tangibles and intangibles. 
 
By such reasoning, it could be possible initially to disaggregate elements within the benefit and cost 
streams and measure them differentially (i.e. weighting) with respect to discount rates before 
eventually aggregating them for a final evaluation (cf. Geltner and Mei,1995). 
 
Distributing wealth 
Who gets any wealth created by planning? It can be created via two situations. First, a public initiative 
involving change is taken, such as a landuse rezoning, the designation of an area or placement of 
infrastructure. It can have direct and indirect, private and public benefits and costs, potentially 
representing a large number of wealth outcomes as illustrated in Table I. The second possibility is 
that, under existing planning, a party takes action which also results in wealth outcomes (Table II). 
An example could be the opening of a large retail store on land already zoned for the purpose (i.e. a 
permitted use not involving public sector change). 
Clearly, the chief problem in Table I is weighing the value of direct or indirect benefits and costs, 
given that both tangibles and intangibles could be involved. Table II employs a technicality of being 
able to identify “other” private parties spatially or operationally close to the initiative as opposed to the 
more removed and diffuse “general public”. The sense is that the “other” parties would receive direct 
benefits or costs while the public would receive indirect effects. More generally, though, there are 
theoretical conditions in both matrices which indicate the achievement of benefit at no cost (beyond 
that of operating the planning system which, for present purposes, could be considered trivial). 
In circumstances (however rare) of a Paretian improvement, does the distribution of wealth 
actually matter (cf. Smith, 1977, p. 54; Tisdell, 1982, pp. 413-14)? Many planners would argue 
affirmatively since, traditionally, the discipline has seen its effect on wealth distribution as regressive. 
But are these views from the days when, in global stakes, the West was (number) one? If the income of 
Western countries is adjusted for inflation (real GDP), population growth (real GDP per capita) and, 
finally, the normal depreciation of social assets, some economies appear far less prospective. Nations 
today are less isolated than before and few consider themselves sufficiently wealthy knowingly to 
dilute their competitive advantage or reject benefits simply because, domestically, their rich might get 
richer. At a much lower level, local politicians understand the situation quite clearly. Economic 
development, if not conducted to “beggar thy neighbour”, is at least “dog eat dog” and practical 
planners are expected to facilitate and pitch once a prospective project is in the wind (Feagin, 1990, p. 
269). 
 
Table I. Outcomes pursuant to a public planning change 
 
Benefits  Costs 
Private (individual)a Public (general)a Public (general)
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Directb Indirectb Direct Indirect
X      
X X  
X X X  
X X X X 
X X X X X
X X X X X X
 
Etc. through all combinations until zero benefit cells are subscribed 
Notes  
a positive externalities  
b negative externalities 
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Table II. Outcomes from a private initiative under an existing planning system 
 
Private benefits Private costsb 
Initiator Othersa Public benefitsa Initiator 
x 
x x 
x x x 
x x x x 
 
                          Etc. etc. through all combinations until zero benefit cells are subscribed 
Notes 
a positive externalities  
b negative externalities 
 
The more cogent consideration involves benefits and costs, the domain of practical equity. Planning has 
generally addressed mixed outcomes by attention to planning gain and systems of betterment and 
compensation, the latter normally applying only after a public initiative (i.e. within Table I above). The 
microeconomic backdrop is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle (or neo-Paretian criterion) which 
asserts that, if a policy change results in some people being made better and some worse off, and if the 
gains of the former are sufficiently large to compensate the losers and still leave something over, the 
change is deemed an improvement. Further elaboration is offered in the Skitovsky double criterion 
(George and Shorey, 1978, pp. 61-2; van den Doel and van Velthoven, 1993, pp. 32-3). Justification for 
statutory planning in circumstances of mixed benefits and costs is that it provides some predictability and 
transparency and, for those negatively impacted, can be much cheaper than common law remedies. 
Still, the economic problem remains of pairing a private benefit against a public cost, a tangible 
against an intangible, these conditions vice versa, the relative effect of gains and losses against initial 
wealth endowments and so on. 
Though the problems are fundamental, they remain unresolved in postwar planning literature 
and one wonders about the will for a theoretical resolution which can be generally applied in practice. 
Here a number of angles can be examined[5]. In its treatment of investment, a planning system could 
manipulate such objects of desire as money, status or power, all of which are normally in short supply. 
The degree to which the system delivers equity could be read in its usefulness in removing or reducing 
conflict over such resources among would-be consumers. From the postmodernists one appreciates 
that there is no such thing as absolute justice: it varies cross culturally and over time. Theories of 
social justice fall between those who favour the market as arbiter and those who prefer public 
interventions. For its part, a planning system could be weighted in either direction. 
Market theorists cover the New Right, libertarians, economic rationalists, “dries” and some of 
the more traditional liberals. In planning, they might advocate “market planning”, a new persuasion of 
the 1990s (Banerjee, 1993; Richardson and Gordon, 1993). The broad theme is that social welfare, 
justice and equity are maximised by the pursuit of individual gain. Entitlement or desert theory, for 
instance, states that individuals should reap the rewards of effort and the disbenefits of inappropriate 
behaviour, preferably as would occur before the introduction of public initiatives such as tax and welfare 
systems. Reward is generally for achievement (hopefully legitimate) rather than effort, and initial 
advantage is not to be offset. A planning system run under such lines would probably eschew interests in 
betterment and compensation or concepts of planning gain. Even assuming that social stability was 
maintained in a situation of uneven and perhaps widening distribution, the question remains open of 
whether aggregate wealth could be technically maximised. 
A second prescription is classical utilitarianism, derived from Hume, Mill and Bentham, which 
argues that society is rightly ordered when major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest 
net balance of utility summed over all individuals. This social good, maximal utility, should be 
achieved independently of issues of its distribution among members of a society. Even if this view can 
be countenanced, problems arise in measuring individual utilities which operationally invalidate many 
of the claims of this school (see also Oxley, 1975, p. 500). Resourcists argue that since tastes are so hard 
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to measure, it is better to focus on how much everyone is allocated and let people do with resources what 
they wish. The counter is that there are significant differences in abilities to use resources and so 
people might not achieve the same utility from a given allocation. 
On the side of intervention, three main themes deserve attention: 
 
(1) Rawls’ (1971) view of justice as fairness; 
(2) egalitarianism; and 
(3) the situation of equity in practice. 
 
First, Rawls argues that a just outcome depends on a fair process and, in planning, supporters of 
rationality have often argued that it promotes a system of allocation which is at least transparent and 
predictable. Fair processes can hardly proceed in states of initial advantage and thus Rawls introduces 
measures to square up the baseline before allocations occur [6]. A good deal of reasoning later comes 
the proposition that inequalities can remain in a just distribution which has occurred as a result of a fair 
process. Indeed, justice can be achieved when the lot of the most disadvantaged is improved somewhat, 
irrespective of whether an uneven share of the gain went to those who already had a disproportionately 
large amount. Such a view can be interestingly contrasted with Paretian positions. 
As distinct from Rawls, egalitarians argue that people ought not to suffer disadvantage from 
events over which they have no control. Such disadvantage creates a case for compensation, as frequently 
proferred within planning. Once compensation is admitted, egalitarians might stumble over how it is to 
be distributed, given that people present with differing initial endowments. 
The practical approaches to equity revolve around equality of opportunity and outcome, the first 
being the more prominent. A moderate view of Miller (1993, p. 200) is that social equality consists of a 
range of outcomes subject to the understandings that: 
 
• differential rewards accrue to people on the basis of real differences in effort and ability; 
• no one’s standard of living should fall below a prescribed minimum;  
• the range of inequality should not be so great as to engender class divisions. 
 
Given the postmodern critique of totalising and unitary solutions, not all societies in which 
planning is practised will want, or be able, to adopt such a script even if it should represent some kind 
of social justice. The planner Sean McConnell (1981, p. 190-1) raises the issue of whether systems 
should dispense some (generally accepted) formula of social justice or instead be responsive to the 
community’s demands. He adopts the former as the greater virtue, though others would disagree and, in 
fact, planning systems have been conducted under both auspices. His statement of principle follows 
Rawls, namely that planning decisions should be made for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
in physical, mental, economic, social, political or environmental terms. There are, however, three 
provisos. 
First, Rawls’ “saving principle” is invoked, meaning that any resource which will be of benefit in 
the future is, within reason, protected. Second, any person’s liberty is restricted only for the sake of the 
liberty of others. Third, any future distribution or redistribution of spatial resources, facilities, service 
or opportunities is made equally, with the exception that an unequal distribution or availability is to the 
benefit of the least advantaged in regard to their future opportunities. 
Despite their succinctness and the emphasis attributed (as the very last words of his book), 
McConnell’s prescriptions appear to have attracted little comment in the planning literature. Perhaps 
they are regarded as self-evident. Yet, allied fields such as industrial and technology policy and 
regional development have had lively debate about the effect of public interventions on wealth 
distribution in terms of “picking winners” and “backing losers”. Some commentators have concluded that, 
for the public sector, either focus is too hard and risky, in which case direct subventions to private 
organisations are unwise. There is no recent parallel debate in planning. Having identified this lacuna, 
we will pass on with the observation that it would be surprising if libertarians and market planners could 
wholly accommodate McConnell’s views. 
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Programming wealth 
What is now possible, though, is to restate a rationale for regional and town planning in terms of the 
generation and distribution of wealth. Since planning is a means to an end, economic heuristics can be 
appropriate. By such reasoning, the objective of a planning system should be at least to achieve net 
positive community wealth in both the flow (income) and stock (asset) modes of calculation via the 
evaluation of competing planning measures. The most prospective course would maximise returns or 
benefits relative to costs. They could then be subject to distribution provisos which reflect social 
preferences. 
First, the general aim is written: 
Maximise U = Ui= + Ua 
where: 
Ui = a community’s annual income stream = (Ibs + Tbs) - (Icp + Acp) from equation (1) 
above; 
Ua = the difference in value of a stock of assets at time periods t1and t0. 
 
Any maximisation process is, of course, subject to a set of constraints, particularly regarding the 
community’s annual income stream. An example is the available land stock. The context is thus one of 
mathematical programming. Consequently, the above function might be expressed as: 
Maximise U = Ui + Ua subject to Cl, C2, ... Cm 
where: 
Cl, 2, …m  relate to resource constraints. 
 
Though a detailed specification of such a general optimisation process is extremely complex, 
potentially involving problems with intangibles, a vast array of constraints, non-linear relationships and 
so forth, the general thrust or rationale of planning emerges clearly from the structure and notation 
above. 
In fact, attempts have been made to construct such detailed statements. Herbert and 
Stevens (1960) and Schlager (1965) were oriented mainly toward development forecasting than a 
theory of planning. A more notable example is that of Ben-Shahar et al. (1969), cited here for 
demonstration, which proposes a formulation explicitly concerned with the optimal allocation of 
land such that social welfare be maximised subject to a set of constraints. The approach uses linear 
programming which is the most readily solvable mathematical programming. It involves an 
objective function to be maximised consisting of present values of the sum of demand prices for 
housing bundles and the sum of demand prices of structures accommodating employment activities. 
From this quantity, the present values of total construction costs of dwelling units, employment 
structures, demolition costs of dwelling units and employment structures, the total variable cost of 
transportation activity and the total cost of transportation capacity are subtracted. Constraints 
require that: 
 
• every household be accommodated in each period;  
• a defined growth pattern for each socio-economic group is achieved; 
• land requirements by residential and employment uses do not exceed available land; and 
• the capacity of the transportation system is not exceeded.  
 
A number of balances in each period are also mandated: 
 
• housing stock; 
• the stock of employment structures; 
• residential oriented employment demands; 
• work force employment; 
• work trips; 
• non-work trips for residential uses; and 
• non-work trips for employment uses. 
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The solution maximises the present value of a welfare function and outputs the distribution of 
households of each socio-economic group in each period and in each subarea by type of dwelling 
unit and the distribution of employment structures in each period in each subarea by type, in 
addition to a range of other information such as work trip and non-work trip distributions. 
The work of Ben-Shahar et al. illustrates the complexity of the task of defining planning as 
the optimisation of an objective function. The focus is efficiency as distinct from equity and the 
process does not include distributional constraints which can be considered part of a view of 
planning as a wealth maximisation process. 
Inclusion of distributional constraints might be expressed as: 
 
Maximise U = Ui + Ua subject to Cl, 2, …m and Dl, 2, …n 
where: 
 
Dl, 2, …n represent distributional constraints as among community groups, the advantaged and 
disadvantaged and so on. 
 
Theoretical utilitarians have long faced the problem that maximisation under market forces 
produces externalities. Externalities will likely defeat the object of the exercise in what Oxley (1975, p. 
500) has termed the fallacy of Benthamite additive philosophy. Again, planning should look to 
environmental economics where practical advances in the last two decades have been made with 
weighting and multidimensional scaling techniques, strategic stakeholder analyses and variants of cost 
benefit analysis. In planning as in neoclassical economics, maximisation is likely to remain a 
theoretical condition: the practical requirement of at least a net positive wealth outcome would owe more 
to the view pioneered by Alchian (1950) that any economic enterprise was, in the first instance, about 
survival not maximisation. 
With planning measures selected to optimise the generation of community wealth, distributional 
issues can be considered via conditions derived from Tables I and II and the foregoing discussion. 
Invoking the general notion of a planning balance sheet (Alexander, 1978), several examples can be 
imagined in which, unless notated, U represents both income and asset wealth [7]. 
 
(1) Mixed benefits distributed via the market alone (e.g. libertarian, utilitarian approaches):  
Max U (no distributional constraints). 
(2) Paretian improvement (e.g. theoretical examples in Table I, all benefit, no cost): 
Max Ui subject to Dl (change makes no one worse off in t1 compared with t0); 
Max Ua subject to D2 (disregarding normal depreciation, change makes no one’s assets less 
valuable in t than t0). 
(3) Safety net solutions for disadvantaged (e.g. Miller, 1993, above): 
Max U subject to D3 (minimum absolute wealth for disadvantaged); subject to D4 (wealth 
differential of advantaged and disadvantaged remains within specified relative range). 
(4) Greater relative benefit to the disadvantaged (e.g. essentially McConnell’s (1981) position): 
Max U subject to D5 (net benefits accruing to disadvantaged are greater in relation to their 
asset stock than net benefits accruing to advantaged). 
(5) Weighting formula example: 
Max Ui subject to D6 (twice the relative benefit to disadvantaged compared with advantaged in 
relation to existing asset stocks). 
(6 )   Absolute benefit only to disadvantaged: 
Max Ui =  subject to D 7 (all absolute benefit accrues only to disadvantaged). 
(7 )   No absolute disbenefit to disadvantaged: 
Max Ui subject to D8 (market distribution of benefits but zero cost to disadvantaged). 
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Wealth: some implications 
Our principal interest is underlining the viability of wealth creation to counter the Iack of rationale in 
contemporary planning. We are less concerned to argue any distributional outcome, since different ones 
are appropriate for different circumstances and the debate on equity in planning needs far greater 
extension than possible here. The intent now is to explore two facets of the focus on wealth: first, in 
terms of how such a focus can be developed; and, second, in the efficacy of the redistributional aims of 
planning practice. 
 
A rationale for planning 
A number of planners are well placed to assist the discipline in it current straits. Luke et al. (1988), Levy 
(1990) and Blakely (1994) follow a most prospective approach, that of facilitating economic 
development. All these editions and attendant papers usefully blend academic and practical insights so 
as to offer some ideas and guidance for practitioners in city hall. They also merge the requirements of 
planning with those of development, a nexus frequently overlooked in recent writing. Extension of this 
work is indicated in two directions. 
The first is “upward” toward a broader philosophy. Although the economic development 
literature is accumulating, its practicality appears to have clouded the major opportunity it offers to 
restate a relationship of planning and wealth. Authors propose a range of solutions to “changed 
circumstances” without propounding an overall rationale which might counter some others presently 
circulating in the discipline. Their general theme is a “bottom up”, grassroots approach in which 
communities realise that the largesse of government cannot go on forever and so take direct action to 
assist themselves. The focus is on small to medium enterprise. Supply side issues such as human 
resource development and the role of tertiary education institutions are closely examined. 
In general, the economic development literature is strategic but local in scope. Its aims are thus 
to do with issues such as unemployment, business start-ups and so on. It has not characteristically 
addressed the bigger picture of how wealth is defined in a community or nation, why it should be a 
goal, what it means, and how all forms of regional and town planning can assist in its creation. 
At the local level, then, the precepts of “economic development” school might sit easily with the 
market planning explained by Richardson and Gordon (1993) and Banerjee (1993), but run counter to 
some traditional notions in planning (Blakely, 1994, p. 51). Apart from the lack of attention to broader 
issues of wealth, the reasons this school might thus far have avoided criticism lie in its strategic rather 
than structural interest, the apparent absence of any direct challenge to orthodoxies of physical 
planning and its defensible practicality. 
For all this, Levy (1990) makes a welcome diversion into development planning and 
financing, while Blakely (1994) devotes one chapter to physical planning issues. In the second 
extension “downwards”, this strand could go much further to show how statutory and structural 
measures could facilitate planning by promoting outcomes characterised more by benefit than cost (as 
per Table I). There are, of course, difficulties. Such a move would challenge existing regulatory 
systems in structural planning. Moreover, academia often regards the compilation of inventories of 
initiatives from the field (successful or otherwise) as too mundane or idiographic to merit attention. 
This is why economic development practitioners have recently been active in pioneering their own 
meetings, newsgroups and journals. Their moves are precisely what is needed. 
One could go still further “down” to suggest that interests in wealth generation and economic 
development (at whatever level) will not make much progress until some other topics are addressed. The 
general thesis here is that a society with a poorly developed philosophy of design (in the most general 
sense -- art works, products and packaging, industrial technology etc.) is unlikely to be strong in 
applying such principles to the built environment. Poorly conceived and executed built environments are 
unlikely in these times of global competition to be attractive to investment (cf. Kunstler, 1993). What is 
needed, therefore, is an integrating approach which admits accumulation of wealth as a valid endeavour 
through economic development and supports it by the pursuit of excellence from the basic levels of 
design upwards through the levels of planning. This view is undoubtedly deterministic in the sense that 
it claims that the physical epvironment could influence economic development. Yet, this is a far less 
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heroic assumption than the traditional idea in planning of the physical environment as conditioning 
social behaviour. Moreover, the economic determinism has long been corroborated by sympathetic 
movements in property values. 
 
The efficacy of redistribution 
The practices of betterment and compensation engage direct links between planning measures and 
outcomes affecting landowners. Likewise, developer contributions might be seen as a form of “user 
pays” which free the public purse. Yet, as one moves up the economic and spatial scale, cause and 
effect appear less linked. The efficacy of using an overall planning system as a vehicle of redistribution 
must be questioned, notwithstanding the orthodoxy it commands in the literature. 
As an example, in respect of the conventional focus on the inner urban disadvantaged, it is 
reasonable to ask whether their situation arose directly from planning decisions, or perhaps an absence 
of planning. Either way, it could be reasonable to use the planning system to redress it. Strategically, 
though, the efficiency of redistributive planning needs examination in relation to other economic 
alternatives. This view might appear rather “dry” but it is fair in light of scarce public funds. Moreover, it 
could appear less dry if one argued from an egalitarian resourcist viewpoint that the disadvantaged 
could be made better off in ways more direct than receipt of additional town planning services. By this 
reasoning, which follows Dworkin (1981, p. 189), the disadvantaged might prefer cash-in-hand or other 
solutions which would empower them to improve their situation themselves [81 rather than have 
elements of it adjusted by planners who probably lead a different lifestyle in another part of the city. 
This inner urban case is essentially ex post: the situation was always there, possibly 
deteriorating over the years. Some grew up in it while others, voluntarily or otherwise, moved in. Yet, 
what of ex ante situations, for example on newly developing urban peripheries where it is often argued 
that residents lack services? In this case, a number of observations pertain. The first would be to define 
and redefine services in terms of market or non-market pricing and real or contrived demand. From that 
juncture, the second issue is whether town planning is solely about service provision or whether other of 
its components (e.g. design and maintenance) might contribute equally to lifestyle satisfaction. Finally, 
the point emerges as to whether, at the margin, present planning efforts actually contribute to (or fail to 
erase) disadvantage, all other factors notwithstanding. 
These are broad and timeless questions for another day. They lie on the interface of planning 
and economics, a route infrequently travelled. Such issues, however, are most adequately analysed via a 
focus on wealth creation and distribution as key rationales of town planning. It offers glimpses 
towards, and maybe better prospects of achieving, a vision long held in the discipline, that of a general 
theory or philosophy. 
 
Conclusions: toward a general theory? 
Invoking neoclassical economics and its fellow travellers, rationality and positivism, this paper has 
paused to consider opportunities lost in planning in the last 20 years. The recent worries of authors like 
Beauregard (1990) and Levy (1992) have been answered in a rush of visions and directions. 
Frequently papers have emphasised solution before problem analysis, and few go far to address the 
fundamental questions posed by Wildavsky (1973) and Reade (1983). The best that can be said is 
that, given the range of epistemologies, ideologies and paradigms, there is plenty to discuss. 
In probing the postmodern, identifying ever-worthier ends, or potential recipients of 
attention, some contemporary commentators overlook the accountability requirements of an 
essentially public enterprise. Planning is an applied discipline and its practical pursuit involves various 
operating costs and financial outcomes. The majority of its academicians might therefore be expected 
to deal in matters which bear some relevance to contemporary realities. As far as practical planning is 
concerned, there could be an anticipation at least that it post a net social benefit en route to the ultimate 
objective of community wealth optimisation. If this net condition does not occur, constituents or those 
paying for planning systems might well dispute their value added, allege government for 
government’s sake, dispute that professionals know best, or challenge Sagar’s (1992) idea that it is, in 
fact, the intangible social conditioning (or engineering) of planning which is important. 
In the 1970s, a general theory of planning was effectively set aside, first in a rehearsal of the 
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difficulties by Rittel and Webber (1973) followed by a thoroughgoing denunciation by Mandelbaum 
(1979). Later the postmodern sounded the death knell to meta-theorising by highlighting, inter alia, 
the ambiguities, contradictions, otherness and polyvocalities of the current environment. Yet, of all the 
social sciences, the postmodern appears to have cut the least ice in economics, a discipline which finds 
itself ascendant in practical and policy arenas. At the moment the jury is out. Its likely findings are 
that postmodernism could serve to explicate some existing power relations and social conditions, as 
long as it can use a commonly agreed and understood language and avoid solipsism, which seems ever 
present given its precepts. On the other hand, a postmodern positing of multi-rationalities is unlikely 
to escape the ultimate constraint of the need for survival in a situation of scarce resources, in which 
distinct and unitary rationalities might take over. This is perhaps why its precepts have not been 
widely adopted in economics. 
There is, of course, the counter possibility of increasing social fragmentation which could so 
complicate the empirical reality as to render general theorising futile. This is, in fact, a prospective thesis 
of the postmodern. On one hand, there is the issue of whether communities or nations require any 
semblance of a consensus in order to be called a community or nation. One questions the viability of a 
common “rationality” and hence rational analysis in the absence of some consensus. Maybe if consensus 
is impossible, the only course is dissolution, as occurred in the Soviet Union and is mooted in Canada. 
On the other hand, as illustrated in the play Dead White Males by noted Australian David 
Williamson, it could be that “human nature” overarches the peculiarities of a social order to enforce 
some generalities. 
To the extent that societies or communities opt for mixed economies with a leaning to 
capitalism, analysis of wealth and wealth relations will remain relevant and might form a basis for 
more general theorising. It could also underpin evaluation of the four “recent contributions” 
presented here and others besides. Progress will be made when the “policy analytic” view is 
recognised that planning is more a means to an end than an end in itself (cf. Feldt, 1988, pp. 46-7). 
Secular ends will always remain expansive and means limited. The numerous permutations of Tables 
I and II above suggest that the theoretical task is great, even though, focused on wealth, the rationale 
is constrained and well understood. Under such an aegis, regional and town planning could be seen as 
so closely allied with economics as to form a branch of it. Hereby a well developed and relevant body 
of work could be on hand (see, inter alia, Ball (1992)). Yet, planning over the last 25 years has hardly 
hastened to incorporate developments in economics (cf. Oxley, 1975). Theorising has shown little 
interest in a prospective counterpoise, namely a philosophy of development. Maybe this will emerge 
given the amount of planning work which is now actually undertaken in major development firms. Unlike 
speculators and small enterprises, such companies are big enough and have sufficient experience to be 
able effectively to weigh up the costs and benefits of design alternatives. Often this reflective process 
advantages the community, in terms of an improved built environment as urged by Lucy (1994). 
This paper has thrown no more than an unpolished oar against a tide of confusion in current 
planning literature. The need is to evaluate which of the epistemologies, ideologies, operating 
paradigms or, finally, traditions as outlined by Friedmann (1987) actually clarify the purpose of 
planning. Those which do not should be disregarded lest scarce public resources and intellectual effort 
be devoted to following blind alleys. 
To broaden the ideas outlined here, our recommendations would include a revision of works of 
environmental and social economists such as Clem Tisdell in Australia and Herman Daly in the United 
States as offering far better prospects for the development of planning than groping for truths in a fast 
changing environment [9]. The whole question of wealth creation needs revisiting both theoretically 
and practically: it has merely been raised and inadequately defined here. To handle this matter, the 
questions of efficiency and equity in a built environment context and follow-on issues, planning students 
could often benefit from greater exposure to economics. 
It is not so much the point as to whether previous planning or its literature has been used by 
authors for their own ends: such practice occurs to a greater or lesser degree in any social discipline. 
The question is, rather, whether the chosen ends took sufficient account of prevailing community 
dispositions and aspirations. Not simply because of the onset of an era of economic rationalism but also 
by its own devices, planning has a credibility problem to be addressed and practitioners presently draw 
little aid from the parts of the academy. Given the occupational constraints in city hall, it is the role of 
the academician to address politicians and inform practitioners in a language they can understand. In 
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our estimation, drawn more from consultancy than academic enterprise, the starting place is talk of the 
market. One way or another, that is what planning in the real world is about. 
 
Notes 
1. See Wildavsky (1973); Reade (1983); Lucy (1994). For further examples of disquiet see Alexander 
(1984, 1988); Beauregard (1989, 1991); Burchell (1988); Levy (1992); Mandelbaum (1979); Manor and 
Scheffer (1977); and Meck (1993). This list is not exhaustive. 
2. See Manor and Sheffer (1977); Alexander (1984, 1988). 
3. Feldt (1988, p. 44) puts forward the alternative view that outcomes of planning take so long (five to 20 
years) to materialise that “feedback and corrective actions” become difficult. 
4. Oxley (1975) appears to recognise this point. Note interesting criticisms of Ratcliffe (1974), found on p. 
503 of his article. Our position is that without wealth as a fundamental there can be little welfare. Wealth 
is thus the seminal object of analysis. 
5. Henceforth in this subsection, we acknowledge the work contained in a doctoral thesis in preparation by 
Norman Elvidge of our Department. 
6. In planning, this intervention has been interpreted as a challenge to existing property rights or the 
unacceptability of the distribution of factor ownership (Oxley 1975, p. 501, 503). 
7. This expostion of alternatives might be compared with the positions outlined by Tisdell (1982, pp. 415-
16). 
8. This possibility assumes, with Rittel and Webber (1973, pp. 161-2) that the disadvantaged in a particular 
locality actually perceive themselves as disadvantaged. A cash-in-hand approach raises the prospect that 
those who perceive a problem might be enabled to move away from the area, which socially could be a 
cheaper solution. 
9. The economic repercussions of physical planning and urban design form another whole arena of debate 
which will be addressed in a different forum, along with the possibility of a philosophy of development as 
an adjunct to a general theory of planning. 
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